In the Matter of the Estate of Fred W. Harper : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
In the Matter of the Estate of Fred W. Harper : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinne
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Harper, No. 8049 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2065
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE ~.lATTER OF. T BE ESTATE ) 
) APPEAL 
OF FRED W. HARPER~ ) 
) l'Jo. 8049 
Deceased. ) 
'I . 
··~.·;~_ ....... . 
y..~· .. ~ .. -
,· . --:: ./ 
-----------~!illo~-"'1-1. J~ · :~ IJ 
c: ~ i) ·1 :'\ ·;c.53-
V:....I .1. U j._.: __ ~ 
/ 
CHRIS T. PRAGGASTIS, 
JOHN E. STONE, 
Attorneys for Contestant 
and Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
T .. \BLE OF CONTENTS 
Pe.ge 
STATEMENT OF ?ACTS•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 
S TA'l'E~L-' T'"J: J2 .PJ INTS ••••• o •• • •••••••••••••••• o • • • 3 
.ARG UM:;_-;1-.TT • ••••••••• • • • •••••••••••••••• • • • ••••• • • • 5 
Point I. .The trial court should have held 
that the death of a spouse during the 
interlocutory period does not set the 
property interests in the interlocutory 
decree at large•••••••••••••••••••~•• 5 
Point II. The trial court should have held 
that these property interests were de-
feasible, if at all• only by giving 
notice and opportunity to be heard to 
the heirs and to the administrator of 
the estate of the deceased spouse ••••• 10 
Point III11 Tha trial court should have held 
that the surviving spouse had no 
interest in the propert~ of the de-
ceased spouse because a division of 
property had been effected ............ " 14 
CONCLUSION •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• o•• 15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Bag a 
Dt~land v. DurlandJ 67 Kansas 7341 
74 Po 274•••••••••••••••••10, 14 
Jacobs v. Gaskill, 69 Kansas 872 
77 Po 550••••••••••••o•••••l0, 14 
Johnson's Estate. In Re 35 P 2d 306 
84 Utah l68o•••••••e61 81 9, 14 
Morris v. Propst, 55 P 2d 944 (Colo) •••••••••• l3 
Rasmussen v. Call~ 188 P. 275 
55 Ut~~ 5S7a••••••v•9~~•o•ll, 12 
TIDCTS CITED 
76 ALR 284e••o•••••••••••••••••••o•••••••••••o6, 10 
104 A.'LR 660 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6 
71 ALR 285oe•••••••~·•••••••••-••••••••a••••••l5 
17 Am Jur 375•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••13 
STATUTE C ITBD 
-
40-3-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1943••••••••••••••12 
{Camp La~. 1917 Se.- 2002) 
(ut. Code Ann. 1953 30-3-7) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREMF. COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
Dl TEE MATTER m, THE ESTATE APPEAL 
OF FRED W. HARPER, ) 
No. 8049 
Decee_sed. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal tram the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State a£ Utah 
Honorable Clarence E. Baker. Judge 
STATEMENT CF FACTS 
Zilpha D. Harper, the Petitioner and Respondent, 
and Fred w. Harper, the deceased, were husband and 
wife and owned property in joint tenancy in Salt Lal<:e 
City, Utah. On December 24, 1949, Fred w. Harper was 
a~.rded a decree of divorce fran Zilpha D. Harper, 
and he was also a\ve.rded the above mentioned property 
in said decree. Zilpha D. Harper entered her appearance 
in the action and waived time in Which to answer or 
otherwise plead. She received a copy of plaintiff's 
- 1-
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oamplaint which pr~ed for the divorce and tha award 
ot the property to l'red w. Harper, and consented the. t 
the divorce might be entered against her and the matter 
heard upon the merits at any time without further notice 
to her. The property and the divorce were awarded to 
Fred W. Harper, the grounds of the di?oroe being her 
desertion (R~ 20~26) 
Approximately two weeks before the interlocutory 
period had run and the divorce became final, Fred 
w. Harper died (June 7, 1950), leaving a son by 
a former marriage (Ro 11, 5). It appears from the 
record that Zilpha D. Ha~r on June 19, 1950, 
approximately a week before the interlocuto~ period 
had run, in great hastcwent into court ex parte and 
without notice to any to set the divorce decree asidej 
the petition in this action recited t;he death of 
Fred 17\f. F.arper, and it was granted and an order "vas 
entered setting the divorce decree aside. There was 
no mention of' the property interests in the order (Ro 28) 
Apparently realizing that her procedure in this 
- 2 -
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action was deteotiv:e, the Petitioner brought an 
action on 1Ia.y 22, 1951, to "Establish Rights and to 
Ter.minate Joint Tenanoyn o At this· time notice· was.: 
given to the son and m.other of Fred ·d. Harper and to 
the Administrator, the Contestan'tt and Appellant in thi~~ 
action, answered, denying that Zilpha D «> Harper had 
any- right-s in the property in question and clai!ni.ng that 
the property belonged to the .Estate of Fred W. Harper 
(R .. J.Qc7). 
The facts were submitted upon stipulatiorr to the~ 
trial court, and the trial court granted the petition 
to termi.nata the_ joint tenancy and held that the estate 
of Fred -w. Harper ha.rl no interest in_ the property, fr.om 
which decision the Contestand and Appellcnt now appeals 
(R. 10-12). 
STA'!'IDJU];NT OF POINTS 
· It w~ the Bespondent' :3' contention in the action 
to terminate the aforesaid joint tenancy, that the. 
effect of Fred W. Harper's death before the running· 
of the interlocutory period and/or the petition to 
vacate the divorce decree resulted in the property 
-3-
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award being null and void, which vested the sole owner-
ship or the property in the Respondent by virtue of 
being being the sole survivor of a joint tenancyo 
It is the contention or the Appellant that the 
death of Fred w. Harper during the interlocutory period 
did not set the property interests awarded by the 
interlocutory decree at large; that such property interests 
were defeasible, if at all, only by proper judicial 
proceedings, which should have included notice and 
opportunity to be heard to the heirs and administra-
tor of the Estate of Fred w. Harper. It is the further 
contention of the Appellant that since notice and 
opportunity to be heard was not given to the heirs 
e.nd administrator of' the Estate of Fre~ W. Harper that 
the property in question remained the property 
o£ said estate and that Zilpha D. Harper had no rights 
therein. 
Appellant therefore believes that the trial court 
erred in terminating the joint tenancy and in holding 
that the Estate of Fred lf. Harper had no interest 
therein, and in further holding +.hat Zilpha Do 
Harper was ent:i.tled ·co s o!;:.e right or title or interest 
therein and relies upon the following points for a 
,., -
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reversal of this decision• 
1. THE TRIAL COURT S~-I'~·Trt.:J F.AVE HELD THAT THE 
DEATH 0? A SPOtTSE DURING THE INTERLOCUTORY PRPIOD 
DOES NOT sgT THE PROPE.."R.TY INTERESTS IN THE JNTERLOCU· 
TORY DECREE AT LARGE. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT S!!OULD HAVE HELD 1H..~T TJifE SE 
PROPERTY INTERESTS VI!ERE DEFEASIBIF., IF AT ALL, O:NLY 
BY GIVING NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HE.d.R:"'J TO TEE 
HEIF.S A.l\lD ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF TEE DEC~..SFD 
SPOUSE. 
3. TEE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD THAT THE 
SUIDTIVING SPOUSE FAD ~TO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
OF TEE DF.CE.~ED SPOUSE BECAUSE A DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
HAD BEEN EFFECTED. 
ARGUlviENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT SHO~D HAVE HELD THA.T TEE 
DFJ\.TH OF A SPOUSE DURING TEE I~ITERLOCUTORY PE~RIOD 
DOES NOT SET TEE PROPERTY mTFBE.~TS IN THE INTERLOCU-
TORY DECREE AT LARGE. It should be noted at the out-
set that the Respondent's theory is quite anamalouso 
She cl~ .. ims all of' the property by virtue of being the 
sole survivor of a joint tenancy. The fragility of 
a joint tenancy is too well known to require citation. 
TJ - ~-~-·~ A~~ect of the interlocutory decree award-
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• all o£ the property to the husband would be to 
destroy the joir.rt tenancy. But she asserts tho.t her 
action in attempting to set ·the interlocutory decree 
aside reinstated the joint tenanoy. But her husband 
was then dead. Even if the court desired to do this, 
how could it make her e. joint teaant with e. deceased 
persont 
The general rule and the rule followed in Utah 
as set forth in Re Johnson's Estate, 35 P 2d 305, 
84 Utah 16~~ is that where one of the parties to a 
divorce action dies within the interlocutory period 
the surviving spouse is still considered to be married 
to the decedent and has all of the rights of the 
marital status. The reason usually given is that 
a divorce aution is a purely personal action and 
abates with death, 76 ALR 284, and cases cited 
therein. But where property interests are awarded 
by the decree, the interlocutory decree may speak 
conclusively. ~:uoting from 104 A.LR 660: 
"It has been held that Where an interlocutory 
decree of divorce rendered before the death of 
one of the parties to the action deals not only 
with the personal status of the parties, but 
also with the property rights, it may, if not 
- 8 ... 
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vacated in the mode prescribed by law, beoo.mes a 
final and oonclus:i.ve decree e.s to the right of 
property notwithstanding the death of one o£ the 
parties to the action. Abbot v. Superior Ct. {1924) 
29 Cal. App 660. 232 P. 154; Klebora v. Kibora 
(1931) 118 Cal. App. 313, 5 P. (2d) 965o The 
court in the latter case saida 'The appellant's 
five contentions which have been enun1erated are 
really reducible to this--that the death of one 
of the spouses before the year has run is produc• 
tive of the same legal consequences as to property 
rights ettled by an interlocutory, as those 
produced with respect to the marital status; in 
other words, the death automatically vacates the 
adjudication and sets the question of property rights 
at large. Such contentions finds no support 
in the authorities. The cases, indeed, are all 
the other way. It may be argued that the Gould 
case (Cel. Infra) is distinguishable because 
there an agreement formed the basis for the 
decree. The appellant stresses the point that 
here there was no agreement; but that can make no 
difference, for a 'judgment' is a contract, in 
the highest sense of the term' •••• Death would 1.ot 
have set at naught an ag~eement bet~~en the spouses• 
If, then, .they could have settled their property 
rights with finality by contract, it is difficult 
to perceive, in via'VIr of the rule just discussed, 
how a judgment which does the same thing possesses 
no such finality, and is of lesser dignity. 
So, it was held in Gould v. Superior Cto 
· (1920) 47 Cal. App. 197, 191 P. 56, that while, 
after the death of one of the parties to a 
divorce suit, the court which has theretofore 
entered an interlocutory decree of divorce loses 
jurisdiction to enter a final decree thereafter 
dissolving the marriage status, where property 
rights of the parties have been fixed by an 
agreement and confirmed by the interlocutory 
decree, the deat~ of one of the parties does 
not oust the court of jurisdiction to enter 
a final decree e.s to such property rightsG" 
In other words, the reason that the decree 
so re.r as the property interests are concerned is 
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given a different status from the marital relation-
ship is that it is or ths nature of a contre.ct., 
only of a higher dignity, and hence survives the 
death of a spouse; intrinsic also is the C0"1.lerr~ th~t 
the property rights have been fully litigated; that 
it is res adjud:tcata, and that; the death or e. spouse 
in itself adds nothing to the faot that the issue 
has been fully litigated. 
Although we have f'ound no Utah case exactly in 
point, there is a strong inference in In Re Johnson's 
Estate, supra, that Utah follows the majority ruleo 
In tbAt case it is held: 
11 It is further contended by appellant tnt. since 
the decree of divorce provided for the payment 
of alimony in the sum of $10.00 per month, 
this was such a property settlement between the 
parties to the decree as to preclude the plaintiff 
fram having any interest in the estate or her 
deceased husban~ and, having no interest in his 
personal estate~ she could be disqualified from 
administering his estate under Com. Laws Utah 
1917 Sec. 7596, now Rev. St. Utah 1933, Sec. 
102-4-10 The decree itself is silent on the 
matter or property settlement or division. The 
awarding of alimony in the decree in this case 
cannot be said to be an adjudication of property 
rights so as to preclude plaintiff from havin 
an interes in t e ecease us an 's estate as 
his widow •••• 1J\1hether an e:vvard of alimony may not 
be considered aB a property division under any 
circumstances, we do not decide. -v~·e simply hold 
- 8 -
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That the award involved in this case did not 
constitute rt property division-ott (emphasis our 
own). 
In the case under consideration we definitely do 
have an adjudication of property rights, a division of 
property based upon the degree o£ guilt. Henoe, it 
we follow the inference of the Johnson Case, supra, 
and the general rule as established in other states, 
we must conclude that the decree speaks finally as to 
those property rights adjudicated. We fUrther contend 
that under the Utah rule where property right;s are 
adjudicated in the divorce decree, the vdfa (or other 
spouse) is precluded fram further sharing in the estate 
of the deceased spouse. 
We also maintain tr~.t this rule is founded upon 
strong and compelling equitable considerations and 
is not merely spun from the fabric of' metaphysical 
legal logic. The innocent and moving party in a divorce 
action is usually awarded a larger portion, if not all, 
or the property. In such circumstances, if the rule 
were otherwise, it would be the guilty party, not 
the izmooent part:r, who would attack the decree; and 
it would be the guilty party who would profit fram 
a different rule~ 
----'-,·· +'h; ~ Court intends to follow the Kansas 
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rule of Dt~land v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 74 P 274, 
where under similar circumstances it was held 
{see 76 .ALR 291) that tha provis:i 0!1)3 of the divorce 
statute in accordance with ·whioh the decree was 
rendered were intended to prevent a marriage by either 
party '~thin six months after the decree and that as 
to that matter only the decree was not final, every 
other result was a canpleta dissolution of the marriage 
following at once. Se also to the same effect is 
Jacobs v. Gaskill, 69 Kan. 872. 77 P 550o 
2 • THE TRIAL COURT. SHOuLD HA 1fE :EmLD THAT THESE 
PROPERTY mTERESTS ViERE DEFEASIBLE, IF .AT ALL, O~TLY 
BY GIVThiG NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE 1.TF'J\RD TO 
~ HEIRS .MJ"'D TO TEE ADMINISTRATOR 0:7 THE EST.A.TE OF 
THE DECEASED SPOUSE. It will be recalled that under 
the hYbrid theory of the Respondent that she claims 
all of the property by virtue• of being the sole 
survivor of a joint tenancy. Since the trial court 
entering the order setting the decree aside could not 
make her a joint tenant with a deceased peron•• and 
since no order was entered transferring the entire 
property to her, the only theory under Which this 
con·tention could be sustained is that the interlocu• 
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tory award of the property had no effect vrha·tsoever, 
and that the joint tenancy in existence before the 
decree in fact continued throughout the interlocutory 
period notwithstanding the co~t• s interlocw.tory avrard 
of the property to her hus.band. I.m1 other words, from 
the standpoint of theory, the court would ha.w to hold 
mot only that the decree set the property interests at 
large_ but that the interlocutory award of the property 
had no effect whatsoever. 
The property interests established by the interlocu-
tory decree are not ~ vapid as to disintegrate upon, 
the death of one of the spouses~ during the interlocu-
tory periodo The rule in_ Utah seems quite_. clearo 
There is substantial authority to the effect that the:-
property interests eatablished by the interlocutory 
decree are wasted subj eet only to divestment by proper 
judicial proceedingso It should also be recalled 
that under our practice no further a~ is requi~ed 
to complete the div:ore£); it becomes final automatically 
upon the expiration of the interlocutory period, and 
it is not necessary as it is: in·. some states to file 
a finaJ. decreea 
In Rasmussemvo Call, lSS P 275, 55 Utah 597, 
,, 
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the wife secured a divorce from the husband, and the: 
husband before the interlocutory period had run o.ame 
in ex parte and without notice to the wife and had 
the court on its om motion vac-ate the decree. The 
husband argued that the court could vac~ate the decree 
upon its own motion by v.d..rtue of Como Law 1.917, Section 
2002 (now, unchanged, Utah Code Annotated, 1943J 
40-3-7). This- coUl't held, quoting from page; 276: 
n~ue, in section 2002, supr·a, proeee.dings: to 
r.e"'iew the decree upon the oour.t' s own motion 
are mentioned; but it was not wi.thint the contem-
plation of the Legis-l.ature that aufficient cause; 
could D:e determined to exist without an opportunity 
~given} to the parties interest t.o be heard in·_ 
defense of any rights granted by the interloc.u-
tory decree. 'Sufficient cause' means leg~ 
cause. To deprive plaintiff of the rights~ 
given her by the interlocutory decree without 
notice_ and opportunity to be heard is not due 
proeess of law; in fact, it is without any 
process on 
The court says: on page 276: "The ef'f.eat of the 
interlocutory decree being to vest .. im. plaintiff' 
ce~tain personal andprope~ty rights, it neeessarily 
follows- that the existence of those righta. denies 
to any court the authority or right to ta.ke the 
s:am.e from her J except upon legal proceedings~ in 
'mich plaintiff, as the interested party, has 
an opportunity to be heard in disproof of any 
attacks upon,_ such rights, and to establish the 
fact that she i.s j ust,ly entitled to the rights 
sought to be ts:en from her. tt (emphasis our ovvn) 
It follows~ that if the property interests estahlished 
by the interlocutory decree are vested in the spouse 
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so that the absence of notice and opportunity to be 
heard would violate due process requirements that 
the same requirement extends to the heirs and the 
administrator or the estate or the deceased spousao 
In 17 Am. Jur. 375, Section 457, it is heldt 
"Persons whose interests will be adversely affected 
by the vacation of the judgment or decree must be 
made parties defendant to the proceedings, and must 
be served with process •••• Where the husband at 
whose instance the divorce was procured ,dies 
leaving both real and personal. estate in w.hich 1he 
surviving wife would have had an interest except 
for the divorce, both the personal representatives 
and the heirs of the husband are prop~r parties 
to proceedings by the wife to vacate the judgment 
or decree." 
See also Morris v. Propst, 65 P 2d 944 (Colorado, 
1936) where the court saysa 
"A divorce action is a purely personal action 
I 
which does not survive the death of either 
party. A seemdng exception, apparent only, 
arises When such an aotion involves an issue 
of property. ·In that event, of course, the 
administrator must not merely be noticed into 
court, but he must be proceeded against as a 
part.y, either by proper substitution or in a 
separate action; and, where the ppoperty issue 
is thus made, the persons interested as heirs 
or otherwise must be made parties and. ~iven 
their day in court." 
We subm.it therefore that the court entering the 
order setting the decree aside had no jurisdiction 
to do so~ so-far as it concerned the property interests 
- 13-
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of the heirs and the Estate of F~ed w. Harper. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE HEID THAT THE 
SURVIVL\JG SPOUSE HAd NOT. iNTEREST IN THE PROPFltTY 
OF THE DECEAS:ED SPOUSE BECAUSE A DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
HAD BEEN EFFECTED. It follows. that if the abo'\te 
two propositions propounded by the Appellant are 
correct, ~hat the pr-operty in question belongs: to 
the estate of the deceased spouse. The nexil ques.tion 
for consideration is whether the. s-urviving spouse. 
should share as an heir or otherwide in the es;,tate:: 
of the deceased spouse." If this~ Court should Chosa 
to follow the rule, in the Kansas_ c-ases_, supra, or 
th& inference in the J~bhnson Case, supra, there is 
no question that the sur'9!iving spouse in the instant 
case would be precluded from sharing further in the 
estate of the deceased s.pouse o There is no question 
that in the case under consideration a div.ision of 
property was: made, and the property vras awarded to 
the innocent party. 
However, in any event, it should be remembered 
that the grou..'l1.ds: for the divorce in the present case 
were desertion. Although the general rule in the 
case of desertion is thet the dower of the deserting 
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spouse is not barred, she is barred £ram asserting 
her distributive share, 71 ALR 285. 
CONCLUSION 
To rscapitulate,., we submit that the affect of the 
interlocutory decree was to vest in the deceased spouse 
the property rights awarded by the decree; that these 
interests ~re defeasible, if at all, only by proper 
judicial procealngs. by giving notice and opportunity 
to be heard to the heirs and the administrator of' the 
estate of the deceased spouseJ that such proper judicial 
proceedings were not hadJ and that since a division 0£ 
property had been effected, the surviving spouse was 
not entitled to share in the property• which remained 
property of the estate of the deceased spouse• either 
as an heir or otherwise, 
We therefore respectfully request that the deci-
sion of the trial court be reversed and that the 
property in question is the property of.the estate 
of Fred W. Harper and that Zilphe. D. Harper has no 
rights or interests therein. 
Respectfiully submitted, 
CHRIST T. PPAGGASTIS, 
JOHN E. STO:NE, 
Attorneys for Contestant 
and A.ppe llant • 
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